A wide range of learning tasks require human input in labeling massive data. For this labeling and because of the quantity of the data, crowdsourcing has become very crucial. The collected data though are usually low quality as workers are not appropriately incentivized to put effort. Significant research has focused on designing appropriate incentive schemes but do not capture the full range of tasks that appear in practice. Moreover, even if incentives are theoretically aligned noise in the data can still exist because it is hard to model exactly how workers will behave.
Introduction
Modern science and business involve using large amounts of data to perform various computational or learning tasks. The data or their labels that are required by a particular research group or enterprise are usually provided by other entities and might contain errors and inaccuracies. Most of such tasks, crucially rely on having data of high quality and hence it is important to develop methods for identifying and correcting potential errors that might affect the output of the desired computational task.
Crowdsourcing [18] is a popular instantiation of such a phenomenon where data is provided by a very large number of workers. These workers may need to put significant effort to extract high quality data and without the right incentives they might choose not to do so giving, as a result, very noisy and unreliable reports. Designing good incentive schemes is a challenging problem studied by the field of mechanism design. As we describe in the related work section, this line of work attempts to align the workers incentives by providing appropriate payments. However, in order to theoretically formulate crowdsourcing environments, several assumptions are needed about the workers' rationality and behavior to quantify the workers effort in terms of money. As these assumptions are often fragile, it is likely that not all workers are going to follow the equilibrium strategy that the theoretical model suggests, especially considering the increasing number of workers that are involved in crowdsourced computation tasks. In addition, this line of work focuses on specific tasks and does not capture the full range of crowdsourcing applications while in practice several ad hoc methods are used instead.
There are a large number of examples where crowdsourcing fails in practice because of those reasons. Experimental results [28, 47, 48] have illustrated that this is frequently the case. An anecdotal failure is the example of Walmart's mechanism that made the famous rapper Pitbull travel at the remote island of Kodiak, Alaska, see e.g., [1] . In 2012, Walmart asked their customers to vote, through Facebook, their favorite local store. The store with the most votes would host a promotional performance by Pitbull. Probably as a mean joke, a handful of people organized an #ExilePitbull campaign, inviting Facebook users to vote for the most remote Walmart store, at Kodiak. The campaign went viral and Pitbull performed at Kodiak, in July 2012. While the objective of Walmart was to learn the location that would maximize attendance to the concert, the resulting outcome was terribly off because the incentives of the workers were misaligned.
Our work is motivated by these observations and aims through the use of verification to provide a generic approach that guarantees high quality learning outcomes. Verification can be implemented either directly, in tasks such as peer grading, by having an expert regrade the assignment, or indirectly, e.g. in the Walmart example by verifying the locations of the voters. Our framework aims to minimize such verifications since they can be very costly.
Our Model and Results
A large set of workers may contain, apart from the set of workers that reported correctly, a set of workers ∖ that due to lack of motivation misreported the answers. But how much does the presence of these misreporting workers affect the output of the computation? The answer to this question depends on the number but also on the importance of workers that have misreported for the specific computation task that we want to run.
Task
Workers N Reported Data x In order to assess whether the computed output is accurate, the designer can verify the correctness of some of the reports. The goal of the designer is to verify as few reports as possible and eventually be confident that the output of the computation is accurate.
But what is an accurate computation result? Ideally, it is the result we would get if all workers gave truthful reports. Such a benchmark, however, is impossible to achieve as the true values are unobservable and many times even if true values were observable after verification we cannot be certain that some agent's true value wouldn't change the output of the computation drastically unless we verify everyone.
We instead focus on a simpler benchmark. We want to decide whether given an instance of workers' reports the output of the computation based on is close to the output of the computation based only on . That is, if we could see which workers misreported and perform the computation task after discarding them, would the output of the computation be close to the current value?
Certification Schemes A positive answer to the question above is called certification of the computation task based on the data that are given by the workers. A negative answer is a witness that at least one of the workers misreported together with the identity of this worker. Our first goal of this paper is to provide certification schemes for general computation tasks that verify only a small number of worker reports.
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As a toy example of these models let us consider the simple function ( ) = max ∈ , where we assume that the report of every worker is a real number ∈ R. For the certification task we want to check whether ( ) = ( ) or not. This can be easily done by checking whether the worker * = arg max ∈ has reported correctly or not. Not all functions have such efficient deterministic and exact correction schemes. For several functions, we can obtain randomized certification schemes that succeed with high probability and certify that the output is close up to a multiplicative factor. Moreover, for some functions it might not even be possible to efficiently certify them without certifying almost everyone. One extreme such example is a threshold function that is 1 if all reports are correct and 0 otherwise, I = where we cannot obtain any meaningful approximation without verifying Ω( ) workers.
In Section 3, we provide efficient certification schemes for many different functions. Our results are the following: -sum function. We start by presenting a randomized scheme for certifying the sum of worker reports that uses only ( 1 ) verifications to certify correctness up to a multiplicative factor 1 ± . This is a very useful primitive that can be used in several different tasks: For example for computing the average, we can compute and certify the total sum of reports and divide by the total number of reports which we can also certify as another summation task. Another example is the max-of-sums function, where as in the Walmart example we presented earlier, agents vote on different categories and the goal is to compute the total category that has the maximum number (or sum) of correct reports. This can be easily certified by computing the max of all sums of reports and certifying that that sum is approximately correct. -functions given by linear programs. We then study the functions that are expressible as LPs where the input of the agents corresponds either to variables or constraints of the LP. We show that for functions expressible as packing or covering LPs, only ( 1 ) verifications to certify correctness up to a multiplicative factor 1 ± while for more general LPs we provide a deterministic scheme that depends on the dimensionality (number of variables or constraints). -instance-optimal schemes. To study more general functions, we devise a linear program that characterizes (up to a constant factor) for any given instance the minimum number of verifications needed for approximate certification. We show that even though optimal certification schemes may be arbitrarily complex, there are simple schemes that verify agents independently that are almost-optimal. --Lipschitz functions. We provide solutions to the instance optimal linear program for a large class of different objectives that satisfy a -Lipschitz property. We illustrate the flexibility of this constraint by showing that even very complex functions that correspond to NP-hard problems satisfy the -Lipschitz property. We prove this for the TSP problem and the Steiner tree problems where we show that the certification complexity is only ( 1 ). These capture settings where agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to design an optimal tour that visits all of them (TSP) or connecting them in a network by minimizing total cost (Steiner tree).
Correction Schemes Although very useful, the certification process fails when at least one misreporting worker is found. Naturally the next question to ask is how we can proceed in order to actually compute the value of the function that we are interested in by throwing away incorrect reports. In a worst case example where all reports are incorrect, we would need to verify all the agents to complete the correction task. To get a more meaningful and realistic measure of the verification complexity of a task, we carefully define it in terms of a budget . For verification complexity , we assume that the designer has an initial budget for verifications = which decreases as he performs verifications but might increase every time he finds an incorrect report. The rationale behind the increase is that often times verifications of incorrect reports may be a lot less costly or the might be associated with penalties which make up for the cost of additional verifications. We distinguish correction mechanisms into two models depending on the budget increase (see Figure 3 ).
In the weak correction model, the budget increases by every time a misreport is found. This means that finding an incorrect report allows us to restart the process from the beginning.
In the strong correction model, the budget does not increase but does not decrease either. This means that verification of incorrect reports is costless. Notice that in the example of the max function, if the certification fails then we can continue by checking the second largest report and so on until we find a correct report which will give us the value ( ) precisely. This last scheme it is easy to see that it is both a weak and strong correction scheme. In general, though, strong correction schemes are much harder to obtain than weak ones.
It is easy to obtain weak correction schemes by repeating the certification scheme until success. For randomized schemes though, one needs to be more careful as it is possible that errors can accumulate. This is easy to fix by requiring that the certification scheme fails with probability at most 1/ . However, this increases the total weak-verification complexity by a logarithmic factor.
In Section 4, we show that such an increase is not necessary and it is possible to obtain weak correction schemes with the same complexity as the underlying certification scheme (up to constant factors). To do this, we run the certification scheme many times and do not stop the first time it succeeds but continue until the total number of successes is more than the number of failures. A random walk argument guarantees that this produces the correct answer with constant probability. If the objective function is not monotone, additional care is needed to get the same guarantee.
While weak correction schemes with good verification complexity exist for all tasks that we can efficiently certify, strong correction schemes are more rare. In Section 5, we show that it is possible to obtain strong correction schemes for the sum function using only ( 1 2 ) verifications of correct reports. Since that many verifications are necessary to get a 1 ± multiplicative approximation for the sum, this implies a gap between the weak and strong correction models. The gap between them can be unboundedly large though, since as we show for the max-of-sums function discussed earlier that has certification and weak-verification complexity ( 1 ), it is impossible to get a constant factor approximation in the strong correction model without verifying Ω( ) correct reports.
Despite the impossibility of obtaining strong correction schemes even for simple functions such as the max-of-sums, we can show that efficient certification schemes exist for quite general optimization objectives. We prove (Theorem 4) a tight connection to designing sublinear algorithms using conditional sampling [22] that we can exploit to directly obtain efficient strong correction schemes. This gives efficient schemes for general optimization tasks such as clustering, minimum spanning tree, TSP and Steiner tree that capture settings where agent reports lie on some metric space.
Designing Incentive Compatible Mechanisms Our work presents a generic framework for designing schemes to verify the output of a computation based on noisy and possibly adversarial reports. Our work did not attempt to model worker incentives directly but aimed to do the best possible given the reported data. Coupled with a scheme that rewards agents according to their contribution to the objective (e.g. based on Shapley values), it can yield approximately groupstrategy proof mechanisms. This is because, any group of agents that has significant contribution to the objective and deviates will be verified and excluded. In addition, even though in the worstcase correction schemes may need to verify everyone, the number of false reports is not expected to be very large if agents know that they cannot affect the outcome by misreporting.
Previous Work
In the past few years there have been several papers treating crowdsourcing in a framework similar to Mechanism Design [19] . [24] gauge through experiments the elasticity of effort under pay in crowdsourcing, while [23] use learning algorithms to find the optimum crowdsourcing contract, and [39] add experts to the crowd to make non-experts perform better.
Scheduling mechanisms have been used to manipulate the time behavior of the crowd [37, 35] , whereas [21] use incentives to match workers according to their specialization. Several papers address strategies to optimize performance keeping within budget [14, 40, 45] while in [5] the online task assignment problem is treated as a multi-armed bandit under a budget.
The optimal design of non-monetary "prestige" rewards to optimally incentivize the participants is addressed in [25] and in [26, 36, 46] privacy concerns in data gathering are treated through incentives; also in [46] regret minimization is used. Mechanism Design has been used in [13, 17] to analyze crowdsourcing contests as all-pay auctions and in [16, 32, 33] for regression and classification with strategic data providers. Scoring rules for principal-agent problems are designed in [34, 4] and follow-up papers. In [15] , they design mechanisms for crowdsourced binary labeling and [44] extents to non-binary labeling.
When the crowdsourcing task is actually a regression task the work of [8] provides a framework that incentivizes the workers to put the optimal amount of effort. [31] proposes an optimal mechanism to ensure truth-telling by the agents. In [30] , they explore the use of future job opportunities to incentivize effort exertion. In [43] they propose a simple payment mechanism to incentivize workers to answer only the questions that they are sure of and skip the rest. In [11] they revisit the problem of estimating the mean of an unknown single-dimensional distribution from samples given by strategic agents. A different approach was taken by [3] where their goal is to give a decentralized mechanism in which players can pool their data, and distribute partial information to themselves in order so as to increase the utility of every collaborating player.
The idea of the verification that we are using in this paper, is inspired by the area of sub-linear time algorithms and property testing, but has also already been used in a Mechanism Design setting in the work of Fotakis et. al. [20] . In Statistics, there has been a large body of work on how to deal with noisy or incomplete datasets. Methods like imputation [38, 29, 42] create new datasets from incomplete datasets by filling in the missing values randomly according to a maximum likelihood distribution. From a theoretical computer science perspective, the problem of local correction of data has received much attention (some examples include [27, 7, 6, 41, 2, 9, 12] ). The idea of filtering a noisy dataset in order to answer queries according to the correct dataset has been used in [2, 12] . An analog of this idea is used to reliably sample from noisy probability distributions in [9] .
Model and Preliminaries
Notation For ∈ N we denote the set {1, · · · , } by [ ]. Let = [ ] be the set of all workers and ⊆ be the set of workers that report the truth. The set is unknown to the algorithm. Suppose we are given an input = ( 1 , 2 , · · · , ) of length , where every belongs to some set . Let = ( ) ∈ be a vector consisting only of the coordinates of that are in . Our general goal is to approximate the value of a symmetric function : * → R + on input ∈ * . Finally, Every input with ∈ is called correct and the rest ∖ are called wrong. We consider two different tasks; certification and correction.
In the certification task, we count the total number of verifications of worker reports needed to test between the following two hypotheses:
· ( ) (H2) there exists a worker such that / ∈ .
We allow a small probability that the algorithm fails to find a witness, i.e.
In the correction task, the goal is to always compute an approximation to the correct answer, even when the certification task fails. We consider two models for correction the weak correction and the strong correction.
In the weak correction model after finding a misreporting worker we are allowed to restart the task and therefore we do not count the number of verifications that we already used before finding a misreporting worker. So if we have the guarantee that a weak correction scheme uses ( , ) verifications and during the execution of the scheme we find misreporting workers, then the total number of samples used is at most ( + 1) · ( , ).
In the strong correction model instead of restarting every time we find a misreporting agent, we just ignore the data provided by misreporting workers and we also don't count them in the number of verifications. So if we have the guarantee that a strong correction scheme uses ( , ) verifications and during the execution of the scheme we find misreporting workers, then the total number of samples used is at most + ( , ).
Certification Schemes
In this section, we present examples of certification schemes for various frequently arising problems including computing the sum of values or functions that can be expressed as a linear programs. Moreover, we will present techniques for computing the instance optimal certification scheme for any possible function .
Computing the Sum of Reported Values
One of the most basic certification tasks is computing the sum of reported values. For this task, we are given positive real numbers 1 , 2 , . . . , as reported by the workers in the set and want to certify whether the sum of all the reports is closed to the sum of the truthful reports of the set .
More formally, we want to check with probability of failure at most > 0 whether ∑︀
or there is at least one misreporting worker such that / ∈ . We show that there exists an efficient certification scheme for this task:
∑ i∈N i 5 6 Figure 4 : If the non-truthful reports make up more than fraction of the total sum, there is at least probability that a misreport is found with a single verification. does not hold, we can bound the probability that all of the verifications fail to find a misreporting worker, as follows:
The probability that a single verification fails to find a misreport is ∑︀
Therefore the probability that all verifications fail is at most (1− ) . Setting = Θ( 1 log(1/ )), we guarantee that a misreport is found with probability at least 1 − .
Functions given by Linear Programs
We now extend the previous results for the sum function to more general objective functions that can be represented as linear programs. We first consider the special case of packing and covering LPs while later we present a result for general linear programs.
Packing and Covering LP's are parameterized by the non-negative parameters , , . We assume that each worker reports all parameters under his control, i.e. the value and for all , while the parameters are known in advance.
Packing LPs capture settings where several resources (each available in a quantity ) are to be divided among agents in the system and agents report how much of each resource they need (given by ) and how much value they can generate if they are given the resources they ask for (given by ). Our goal is to compute an efficient allocation to agents that maximizes the total value generated. For the certification task, we want to certify that the total value generated by the true agents in an optimal allocation is close to the value computed under the possibly incorrect reports. We show that efficient certification schemes exist by extending the certification scheme presented for the sum function:
, ≥ 0 be values reported by the workers and * be the optimal solution to the packing LP. Consider the probability distribution = * ∑︀ * which assigns workers a probability proportional to their computed value * . Verifying = Θ( 1 log(1/ )) workers sampled independently from , guarantees that the certification task for the packing LP succeeds with probability at least 1 − .
To see why this lemma holds, notice that the value ∑︀ ∈ * computed using the reports of all workers is higher than the value ∑︀ ∈¯c omputed using the true reports . Moreover, if ∑︀
as well, since setting = * for ∈ and = 0 otherwise is a feasible solution to the packing LP under the true reports. Finally, if ∑︀ ∈ * < (1 − ) ∑︀ ∈ * , it means that misreports contribute more than an fraction of the total value and thus a misreporting worker can be easily found as in the previous case of the sum function.
Covering LPs naturally capture various settings with public goods where the designer wants to introduce new goods to satisfy all the workers but minimizing the total cost at the same time. In facility location problems, the designer wants to open facilities so that all agents have access to at least one facility and the agents report which locations are accessible to them.
Certification schemes for covering LPs are less direct than previous examples, but can be easily obtained through LP duality. As the dual of a covering LP is a packing LP which has the exact same value, we can use the certification scheme of Lemma 2 to certify that value. We directly get the following: Lemma 3. Let , ≥ 0 be values reported by the workers . Verifying = Θ( 1 log(1/ )) workers sampled independently according to a distribution given by the solution to the dual packing LP, guarantees that the certification task for the covering LP succeeds with probability at least 1 − .
General LPs can be written in the form of a packing or a covering LP but have arbitrary (possibly negative) parameters , , . The value of such LPs is harder to certify in general as a lot more verifications than before might be needed. However, we can show that verifications suffice to certify the value exactly. To see why this is true, notice that in the covering LP formulation, the optimal value is given by at most tight constraints as there are only variables. Verifying the workers that reported those constraints guarantees that the optimal value of the LP under only the true reports is equal to the computed one. This is because only those constraints determine the optimal value and even if every other constraint was dropped (i.e. because / ∈ ) the value would remain the same. The result also holds for general LPs under the packing LP formulation by LP duality.
Instance-Optimal Certification Schemes
In this section, we present a unified way of finding almost-optimal certification schemes. For a given a function , a desired approximation parameter and an instance , we want to compute the "instance-optimal" number of verifications in order to certify that ( ) ∈ [︁ 1 − , 1
1− ]︁ ( ) with probability of failure at most 1/3. The main result of this section is a structural result. We show that even though optimal schemes may be arbitrarily complex, there are simpler schemes, that verify agents independently, which are almost-optimal.
To show this we define for every set ⊆ the probability that the instance-optimal certification scheme * verifies at least one agent in , i.e. = P (︀⋃︀ ∈ { * verifies worker } )︀ . For such an event, we say that the certification scheme verifies and for simplicity we denote , the probability that * verifies agent , i.e. = { } .
For the instance , the set of misreporting workers could be any ⊆ . For the certification scheme to work with failure probability at most 2/3, we must have that ≥ 2/3 for any subset
If this doesn't hold for some , an adversary could choose the set of misreporting workers to be and the certification scheme * would fail with probability more than 1/3. Moreover, even though the optimal certification scheme * may verify agents in a very correlated way, we have that ∑︀ ∈ ≥ ≥ 2/3 from a simple union bound. Therefore, the certification scheme * must satisfy the following set of necessary conditions:
By linearity of expectation, the expected total number of verifications that * performs is,
The above imply that the value of the following linear program is a lower bound on the total number of verifications needed by the optimal scheme * for this specific instance .
Notice that the solutions to LP (1), do not directly correspond to certification schemes with success probability 2/3. However, as we show, any solution to LP (1) can be converted to a certification scheme with number of verifications at most twice as many as the optimal value of LP (1) and success probability 2/3. Since the optimal value of LP (1) lower bounds the instance optimal number of verifications, our derived certification scheme will be a 2-approximation to the instance optimal scheme.
Definition 1. For a solution¯to LP (1), we define the certification scheme¯that verifies each worker independently with probability = min{2¯, 1}.
It is clear that the certification scheme¯uses in expectation at most twice as many verifications as the optimal value of LP (1) and the instance optimal scheme. We now show that it also achieves, success probability of 2/3 as required.
Assume that the subset of correctly reporting workers is = ∖ . The probability that the scheme¯does not verify anyone in the set = { 1 , . . . , } is P(¯doesn't verify ) = P((¯doesn't verify 1 ) ∧ · · · ∧ (¯doesn't verify )) = ∏︁
Since¯is a feasible solution to LP (1), the probability that some agent from is verified is
This means that our certification scheme succeeds with probability 2/3 using at most twice the optimal number of verifications in expectation. We can amplify the probability of 2/3, making it arbitrarily close to one by repeating the certification scheme. Since the repetitions are independent and each of them fails with probability at most 1/3, after repetitions the total probability of failure is 3 − . Repeating = log(1/ ) times, guarantees that for any subset , the probability that it will be verified is at least 1 − . This result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For any given function : * → R and any set of worker reports , a solution to LP (1) corresponds to a certification scheme that verifies agents independently using at most twice as many verifications as the optimal scheme for this instance and succeeds with probability 2/3. Repeating the scheme log(1/ ) times increases the success probability to 1 − .
Remark We note that the LP (1) has exponentially many constraints and it may be computationally intractable to solve depending on the function. It is very useful though as a tool to uncover the structure of approximately optimal certification schemes. For example, Theorem 1 implies that even though optimal schemes may be arbitrarily complex, there are simpler schemes, that verify agents independently, which are almost-optimal.
In the following section, we derive a general methodology to obtain solutions to LP (1) for -Lipschitz functions.
Certification Schemes for w-Lipschitz Functions
In this section we show how we can use Theorem 1 to get sufficient smoothness conditions on the function that can be used to provide certification schemes with small number of verifications.
For any worker ∈ we define to be the weight of worker . The weight of worker will be the quantity that will determine the probability that we will verify worker according to the verification scheme that we want to define. We state now the property that we want to satisfy in order to find a good verification scheme. Proof. We set = 2 3 ( ) and we show that those values satisfy the LP (1). Thus, if we choose to verify worker with probability min{2 , 1}, we get a valid ( , )-certification scheme.
For any subset ⊆ by the -Lipschitz property we get that
. This means that LP (1) is satisfied. Now we can apply Theorem 1 and we conclude that the certification scheme that verifies each worker independently with probability min{2 , 1}, where workers and has probability of success at least 2/3. In order to get probability of success we instead verify each worker with probability 2 log(1/ ) and the theorem follows.
In Appendix A.1 and A.2, we present two applications of Theorem 2 to get certification schemes for the Traveling Salesman (TSP) and the Steiner Tree problems. In both applications, we show that the optimal solution is -Lipschitz with ∑︀ ∈ ( ) ≤ 2. Hence, the total number of verifications by Theorem 2 is ((1/ ) log(1/ )).
Weak Correction Model
We show how starting from a certification scheme, we can obtain a weak-correction scheme with the same verification complexity (up to constants).
Theorem 3. Suppose that there exists a certification scheme for a function that uses ( , ) verifications and fails with probability 1/3. Then, there exists a weak-correction scheme with verification complexity ( ( , ) log(1/ )) that outputs an accurate estimate of the function and fails with probability .
Theorem 3 shows that the certification task we defined in section 3 is already strong enough to perform this seemingly more challenging task. Intuitively, this is because we can run many rounds of certification until we have enough confidence that we have an accurate result while we remove from the dataset any incorrect datapoint we might find during these rounds. Indeed, a simple way to make the conversion is to start from a certification scheme with error probability 1/3 and reduce its probability of error to / , by repeating it log( / ) times. Then use this scheme repeatedly until no more misreports are detected. By a union bound, the probability of error is at most since the process takes at most steps.
Theorem 3 shows a stronger result than the above result showing that the logarithmic dependence on the number of agents can be avoided if the stopping time is more carefully chosen. We provide here a simple analysis when the function is increasing with agent reports and defer the full proof of Theorem 3 to Appendix B.
Proof for increasing functions. Our weak correction scheme works by repeating the certification process enough times so that the number of times it failed is less than the number of times it succeeded. In particular, we model this procedure as a random walk on the integers starting from point C and ending once it reaches 0. We move to the right whenever the round of verifications (i.e an execution of the certification scheme) reveals some incorrect report, and we move to the left otherwise.
The random walk is guaranteed to return to the origin eventually since if all misreports are removed the certification scheme will not be able to find any additional misreports. The only case that the weak correction scheme fails is if it returns early without removing enough misreports having a value larger than ( )/(1 − ). In such a case, at all points of the random walk the estimate was always larger than ( )/(1 − ) which means that the random walk was biased with probability at least 2/3 to the right. The probability that such a biased random walk reaches the origin is at most (︁ 
Strong Correction Model
In section we present cases where it is possible to obtain much more efficient correction schemes that do not involve repetition of the certification scheme as in the case of weak correction. We first obtain a strong correction scheme for the sum function which also implies strong correction schemes for other functions such as average. However as we show there are simple functions, e.g. the composition of the max and the sum function, which do not admit strong correction schemes but for which good weak correction schemes exist. Finally we show that despite the previous lower bound there is a rich class of problems for which a strong correction scheme exist. We do so by proving a connection of strong correction schemes with algorithms that use conditional sampling.
Computing the Sum of Reported Values
We use the same formulation as in Section 3.1 and we get the following result. 
Consider the probability distribution
= ∑︀ which assigns each worker a probability proportional to their value . If we sample times independently from and verifying workers until = Θ (︀ 1 2 log(1/ ) )︀ correct workers found, then the estimator^= ∑︀ ∈ is in the range
with probability at least 1 − . This gives a strong correction scheme with probability of success at least 1 − .
A detailed proof of Lemma 5 can be found in Appendix C. To see that Θ (︀ 1 2 log(1/ ) )︀ are also necessary let 1 = · · · = = 1/ and let | | = | | where = 1/2. This instance is identical with estimating the bias of a Bernoulli random variable with error at most and since all the 's are equal we can assume without loss of generality that at each step we take a uniform sample from . But it is well known that for estimating a Bernoulli random variable within with probability of failure at most we need at least Θ (︀ 1 2 log(1/ ) )︀ total samples. Half of those samples are expected to be correct samples and hence the verification complexity for any strong correction scheme is also at least Θ (︀ 1 2 log(1/ ) )︀ .
Lower Bound for the Maximum of Sums Function
In this section we show that no efficient strong correction scheme exists for the composition of the max and the sum function. More precisely we assume we have a partition = { 1 , . . . , ℓ } of the set and we want a strong correction scheme for the function ( ) = max ∈ ∑︀ ∈ . We show that any strong correction scheme for that achieves constant approximation has to verify at least a constant fraction of the workers. Lemma 6. Let ∈ R + then there exists a partition = { 1 , . . . , ℓ } of the set of workers and a vector ∈ R such that any strong correction scheme for the function ( ) = max ∈ ∑︀ ∈ , that returns an estimator^such that^∈ [︀ 1 , ]︀ · ( ) with probability at least 3/4, has to verify at least | | /4 2 workers.
A detailed proof of Lemma 6 can be found in Appendix C.
From Algorithms using Conditional Sampling to Strong Correction Schemes
The design of a strong correction scheme is sometimes a very hard task since the guarantee is very strong. Our main theorem in this section shows that there is a nice correspondence of a strong correction scheme with computation using conditional sampling, a model that has been appeared in recently in [22] . This models works very well for problems expressed in the -dimensional Euclidean space.
More precisely we are given an input = ( 1 , 2 , · · · , ) of length , where every belongs in some set . In this section, we will fix = [ ] for some = (1) to be the discretizeddimensional Euclidean space. Our goal is to compute the value of a symmetric function :
. We assume that all are distinct and define ⊆ as the set = { : ∈ }. Since we consider symmetric functions , it is convenient to extend the definition of to sets ( ) = ( ).
The conditional sampling model allows such queries of small description complexity to be performed. In particular, the algorithm is given access to an oracle Cond( ) that takes as input a function : → {0, 1} and returns a tuple ( , ) with ( ) = 1 with chosen uniformly at random from the subset { ∈ [ ] | ( ) = 1}. If no such tuple exists the oracle returns ⊥.
The main result of this section is a reduction from any algorithm that uses conditional sampling to a strong correction scheme.
Theorem 4. An algorithm that uses conditional samples to compute a function can produce a strong correction scheme with verification cost .
Proof. We will show how we can implement one conditional sample using only one verification. We take all the workers reports 1 , . . . , and we randomly shuffle them to get 1 , . . . , . Then we take one by one the reports with this new order and we check if ( ) = 1. If yes then we verify and if it is correct we return it as the result of the conditional sampling oracle. If worker has misreported then we just ignore this report without any cost and we proceed with the next report. If we finish the reports and we found no correct report such that ( ) = 1, then we return ⊥. It is easy to see that this procedure produces at every step a verified conditional sample. Since the conditional sampling algorithm has only this access to the data we get that any guarantees of the conditional sampling immediately transfer to this corresponding strong correction scheme.
The above result gives a general framework for designing strong correction schemes for several computational and learning problems. We give some of these examples below that are based on the work of [22] . For other distributional learning tasks, one can use the conditional sampling algorithms of [10] to get efficient strong correction schemes.
-means Clustering Let be a metric space with distance metric : × → R, i.e. ( , ) represents the distance between and . Given a set of centers we define the distance of a point from to be ( , ) = min ∈ ( , ). Now given a set of input points ⊆ and a set of centers ⊆ Ω we define the cost of for to be ( , ) = ∑︀ ∈ ( , ). The -means problem is the problem of minimizing the squared cost 2 ( , ) = ∑︀ ∈ 2 ( , ) over the choice of centers subject to the constraint | | = . We assume that the diameter of the metric space is Δ = max , ∈ ( , ). In this setting we assume that the workers provide the points in the -dimensional metric space.
Corollary 1. Let 1 , 2 , . . . , be the points in the -dimensional metric space reported by the workers and ( ) be the optimal -means clustering of the points . There exists a strong correction scheme with˜( 2 log log( / )) verifications that guarantees a constant approximation of the value optimal clustering, with probability of failure at most .
The proof of this corollary is based on the Theorem 4 and the Theorem 2 from [22] .
Euclidean Minimum Spanning Tree Given a set of points in R , the minimum spanning tree problem in Euclidean space ask to compute the a spanning tree on the points minimizing the sum of weights of the edges. The weight of an edge between two points is equal to their Euclidean distance. We will focus on a simpler variant of the problem which is to compute just the weight of the best possible spanning tree, i.e. estimate the quantity min tree
Corollary 2. Let 1 , 2 , . . . , be the points in R reported by the workers and ( ) = min tree ∑︀ ( , ′ )∈ ‖ − ′ ‖ 2 . There exists a strong correction scheme with˜( 3 log 4 / 7 ) · log(1/ ) verifications that guarantees an (1 + )-approximation of the weight of the minimum spanning tree, with probability of failure at most .
The proof of this corollary is based on the Theorem 4 and the Theorem 3 from [22] . Remark. Observe that the value of the MST gives a 2-approximation of the metric TSP and the metric Steiner Tree problems. Hence Corollary 2 implies efficient strong correction schemes that achieve constant approximation for those problems as well.
A Applications of Theorem 2

A.1 Optimal Travelling Salesman Tour
In this section we examine the metric travelling salesman problem where we are given points (each provided by one worker in ) in a metric space and we wish to find the length of the minimum cycle going through each point in the set ⊆ of correct answers. As usual we let be the input vector with workers reports whose coordinates are points in the metric space . Our goal is to find a certification scheme for this metric travelling salesman problem. That is, the algorithm should either output a sufficiently accurate value (according to (H1)) for the minimum weight cycle going through the points in or find a misreporting worker 1 . The following lemma combined with Theorem 2 give us the desired result. Lemma 7. Let : * → R be the function mapping a set of points in a metric space to their minimum TSP tour and let 1 2 . . . be the minimum TSP tour. Also, let ∈ R + = ( 1 , . . . , ), where = ( −1 , ) + ( , +1 ) and the second indices are mod . Then, is -continuous.
Proof. According to definition 2, we need to show that for any ⊆ :
To see why this inequality is satisfied, let be the minimum TSP tour going through the points in = ∖ and = 1 2 . . . be the minimum TSP tour that goes through all the points in the set ⊇ . Now let 1 < 2 · · · < be the indices at which the points of the set appear in this TSP tour. Consider two consecutive points , +1 in this sequence and let = { +1 , +2 , . . . , +1 −1 } be the set of consecutive points in the tour between and +1 . Clearly, ∀ :
⊆ and therefore the weights of those points appear in the sum that is in the rhs of equation (2) . Now consider the two paths 1, = , +1 , . . . , +1 −1 and 2, = +1 , +1 , . . . , +1 which are both part of . We have that:
where (·) denotes the length of a path. We now consider the walk that goes through all the vertices in and has the following two properties:
• It respects the order in which the vertices in are visited by
• Between any two consecutive such vertices, it follows whichever path among 1, and 2, has smaller length in the forward and then backwards direction.
We know that ( ) smaller or equal to the walk we have just defined, since the walk goes through all the given points and even repeats the points in 2 . Thus,
Note that throughout this paper we don't consider the computational complexity of the problems, since we are more interested in the number of verifications needed. Besides that in the case of Euclidean TSP we could use the (1 + )-approximation algorithm that we know in order to get similar results and avoid NP-completeness. 2 Since we are working on a metric space, skipping points in the order that we visit them can only decrease the cost.
Using lemma 7 and theorem 2, we get the following corollary:
: * → R be the function mapping a set of points in a metric space to their minimum TSP tour. Then, there exists a verification scheme that uses at most ( 1 log( 1 )) verifications per correction.
Proof. This is a straightforward application of lemma 7 and theorem 2 since ∑︀ ∈ contains each of the edges in the optimal TSP tour exactly twice. Thus,
A.2 Steiner tree
In the classic Steiner tree problem, the input is a positively weighted graph = ( , , ) and the set of vertices is partitioned into two disjoint sets and such that = ∪ . Usually is called the set of terminal nodes and the set of Steiner nodes. The goal is to compute a connected subgraph of that has the smallest possible weight and has a set of vertices ⊆ ′ ⊆ that includes all terminal nodes and any number of steiner nodes.
Here, we are going to examine the Steiner tree problem in the following setting: We are given a fixed graph = ( , ) on | | vertices and we also have | | reports from the set of workers . Each worker reports a node from the set claiming that this node is in the set ⊆ of terminal nodes that need to be connected by the tree. However, the workers might be misreporting and the algorithm is allowed to do verifications on those reports. Let be the input vector whose coordinates are vertices claimed to be in the set of terminal nodes. Similarly, let be a vector containing only a subset ⊆ of those vertices. Our goal is again to be able to either output a sufficiently accurate answer for the cost of the optimal Steiner tree of find a misreporting worker.
As in the previous section we are going to use theorem 2 to achieve this. The conditions of theorem 2 are satisfied in this case due to the following lemma:
= , be a graph and : * → R be the function mapping a set of vertices ⊆ to the minimum cost of a steiner tree connecting the vertices in . Then, there exists a vector ∈ R + such that is -continuous and also ∑︀ ∈ = ( ( )).
Proof. We need to show that there exists a vector ∈ R + = ( 1 , . . . , ), such that for any ⊆ , the following inequality holds:
We start by introducing some notation. Let be a tree subgraph of . We denote by the Eulerian graph that results when we double each edge in . Also, let denote the optimal Steiner tree for the set ⊆ of terminal nodes. Thus, ∀ : ( ) = ( ). Now let be the optimal Steiner tree for some set = ∖ ⊆ of terminal nodes. In order to show equation (3), it suffices to show that there exists a tree and a vector ∈ R + , such that is a valid Steiner tree for the set of terminal nodes and its cost is:
In other words, we would like to find a weight vector ∈ R + , such that starting from the Steiner tree and using the weight assigned to the set = ∖ as budget, we are able to construct a Steiner tree the covers the set . To keep the number of verifications low, we also require this vector to be such that ∑︀ ∈ = ( ( )).
Now fix a specific Euler tour (i.e an ordering of the nodes)
for the graph and also fix an Euler tour for the graph . Note that the cost of each Euler tour is exactly twice the cost of the corresponding Steiner tree (e.g ( ) = 2 ( ) where (·) denotes the sum of weights of all edges in the Euler tour or the tree).
We define each weight to be the length of the path from the predecessor to the successor of node in the ordering . Our goal is to find a new Euler tour which directly corresponds to a valid Steiner tree 3 for the set and is within our budget ∑︀ ∈ . Now let = 1 2 . . . be the ordering in which the terminal nodes are visited in the Euler tour of and 1 < 2 · · · < be the indices at which the points of the set = ∖ appear in this Euler tour. Consider two consecutive points , +1 in this sequence and let = { +1 , +2 , . . . , +1 −1 } ⊆ be the set of consecutive points in the Euler tour between and +1 . Note that the sets are mutually disjoint and therefore: ∑︀
Also, ∑︀
∈ is enough budget to add the set of nodes in the ordering between and +1 . 4 By repeating this for all ∈ [ ], we get the desired Steiner tree that covers all nodes in and is such that:
Thus, is 2 -continuous and also ∑︀ ∈ ′ = 1 2 · 2 · ( ) = 2 · ( ).
The following corollary is a direct application of lemma 8 and theorem 2:
Corollary 4. Let = , be a graph and : * → R be the function mapping a set of vertices ⊆ to the minimum cost of a steiner tree connecting the vertices in . Then, there exists a verification scheme that uses at most ( 1 log( 1 )) verifications per correction.
B Proof of Theorem 3
We will now remove the assumption we used earlier about the function being increasing in order to design a weak correction scheme. We are going to use the same random walk based correction scheme as in Section 4 that starts at and ends at 0. However, instead of outputting the result of the function on the final subset of workers (after all deletions), we will consider every possible intermediate subset of workers during the random walk as a candidate for producing an (1 + )approximate solution. Note that, at each step of the random walk, we run a certification scheme on some set ⊆ . We define a subset ⊆ to be "bad" if ( )
]︁ and to be "good" otherwise.
By the definition of the certification scheme, if the set is "bad", then a misreporting worker is found with probability at least 2/3, in which case the random walk moves to the right. Otherwise, we do not have any guarantee on how the random walk will behave.
However, if at all steps the probability of finding a misreport is more than 3/5, then the probability that the random walk reaches 0 is less than ( 2/5 3/5 ) = ( 2 3 ) < /2 for = (log(1/ )). Thus given that we returned, with high probability, there must be some set for which the correction scheme accepts with probability more than 2/5. Note that, this can only be true if the set is good since 2/5 > 1/3.
At this point, given a list of these subsets, our goal is to find a "good" subset for which the certification scheme accepts with probability more than 1/3. We know that a "good" subset exists for which the acceptance probability is more than 2/5. We view the certification process for a subset as sampling from a Bernoulli random variable. We say that a set has probability if the certification process on the set does not find a misreport with probability .
Let ( , ) be a test that accepts if the probability of a set is more than 2/5 (call such a set "very good") and rejects if it is less than 1/3. Such a test fails with probability requiring (log(1/ )) samples.
The main idea behing this algorithm is to iteratively run ( , ) for all candidate subsets with varying error probabilities to throw out the failing ones until a significant fraction of the subsets in our pool is "good". When this happens, we pick a subset at random and check if it is actually "good" by running ( , ) with small . We repeat this until we actually find a good subset and output the value on the function on that subset. To ensure that this will eventually happen, we choose parameters appropriately, so that a constant fraction of the "bad" subsets fail while the "good" subsets pass the certifications with high enough probability.
Let be the number of candidate subsets . We have that is equal to the number of misreports found during the random walk process.
Our algorithm proceeds in rounds until there are at most / log sets remaining. In the -th round:
• The algorithm runs ( , 10 − ) for every set and discards all sets that fail.
• If the number of remaining sets is did not drop by a factor of 2 the algorithm stops and returns a set uniformly at random from the remaining sets.
If the algorithm has not returned after log log steps, then it runs ( , 1/ 2 ) for every remaining set and returns one that passes the test. The proposed algorithm returns a "good" set with probability more than 3/5 − (1). First, notice that a "very good" set will be discarded in the first log log rounds with probability at most ∑︀ 10 − ≤ 1/10 1−1/10 = 1/9. Hence, if the algorithm did not return after log log rounds, the last step returns a "good" set with high probability.
Now, suppose the algorithm returns at some round . Let −1 be the total remaining sets before round . The probability that the number of "bad" sets remaining after round to be more than −1 /5 is at most:
[ > −1 /5] ≤ exp(− −1 /10) ≤ exp(− −1 /50) ≤ exp(− /(50 log )) This is an exponentially small probability and by a union bound over all log log rounds it is still negligible.
Thus, assuming that < −1 /5 and > −1 /2, a set chosen uniformly at random is "bad" with probability / ≤ 2/5. Therefore, a good set is chosen with probability at least 3/5 − (1) and thus by repeating (log(1/ )) times and choosing the median of the values ( ), we have that with probability 1 − /2, ( )
The total number times the certification scheme is called is (log(1/ )) ∑︀ (2 − log 10 ) = ( log(1/ )).
Thus, the verification complexity of the weak correction scheme is equal to ( ( , ) log(1/ )) and the Theorem follows.
C Missing Proof of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5. We let the random variable to be the total number of verifications until we found correct workers and let ℳ be the set of samples that we observed. Also we define = |ℳ ∩ | / = / . We claim that
. For tha sake of contradiction let > 1 1− ∑︀ ∈ ∑︀ ∈ then < (1 − ) / . Hence the expected number of correct workers if we draw samples according to the described distribution is at most (1 − ) . But know using simple Chernoff bounds and the fact that ≥ 1 2 log(2/ ) we get that with probability at most /2 the number of correct workers found is at least .
Similarly we can show that if < (1 − ) ∑︀ ∈ ∑︀ ∈ then with probability at most /2 the number of correct workers found is at most . Hence we have
but from the definition of the strong correction scheme P(|ℳ ∩ | = ) = 1 and as we proved P (|ℳ ∩ | = | < (1 − ) ) ≤ /2 and
This finally implies that our estimator is in the correct range
Proof of Lemma 6. We consider a partition of into / 2 sets of size 2 each with = 1 for all ∈ . Let be a certification scheme that verifies less than /4 2 workers. Then there exists a set ∈ such that P( verifies some ∈ ) < 1/4.
We prove this by contradiction. Let P( verifies some ∈ ) ≥ 1/4 for all ∈ . Then E[verification by ] ≥ ∑︀ ∈ P( verifies some ∈ ) ≥ /4 2 and hence we have a contradiction on the assumption that verifies less than /4 2 workers. Let^be the output estimator of then we have that Now if we fix ⊆ N, we observe that the quantity P (^∈ | does not verify ) does not depend on ∩ since we are conditioning on the event that does not verify any worker in . Now let be an arbitrary worker from the set ∈ . We consider the following two possibilities for the set .
We observe now that if = 0 then ( ) = 1 and if = 1 then ( ) = 2 . Now since^does not depend on ∩ given that does not verify we have that we can change between 0 and 1 without changing the quantity P (^∈ | does not verify ). Now -if P (^∈ [1, ] | does not verify ) < 1/2 then we set = 1 and -if P (︀^∈ [ ( − 1), 2 ] | does not verify )︀ < 1/2 then we set = 1 .
Observe that one of the two cases has to be true. In any of these we get that and therefore has to verify at least /4 2 workers.
